This paper reports on four basic results of tests of the standard gravity equation. First, geography can serve to reflect comparative advantage as well as transportation costs. Second, the effect of distance on bilateral trade is mostly a substitution effect between closer and more distant trade partners rather than a scale effect on total foreign trade. Third, special political relationships, such as free trade agreements and currency union, do not produce any trade diversion in the aggregate, but increase trade with outsiders as well as among the parties to the relationship. Fourth, Rose's surprisingly high estimate of the impact of currency union on trade stems partly from a selection bias, but even following a correction for this bias, the estimate remains high.
happens. When great-circle distances are taken into account, the larger the absolute difference in latitudes between two countries North and South of the equator, the greater their bilateral trade. This effect of geography shows up consistently with t values of the order of ten without disturbing the rest of the gravity equations. Furthermore, the effect retains this order of significance in all of the extensions below.
As regards the substitution or scale effects of the various influences on trade in the gravity model, some preliminary discussion is required. Attempts over the last twenty years to provide theoretical underpinnings for the model assume that aggregate output in each country (or region) is given, and the output must be sold either at home or abroad. Accordingly, any reduction in the bilateral trade of a country with another means an equal increase in its trade with third countries or at home. Without knowing the sign and the size of the associated change in trade with third countries, nothing can be said about the change in domestic trade.
Notwithstanding, changes in bilateral trade are sometimes merely aggregated to obtain effects on total foreign trade in applications of gravity equations (e.g., Frankel and Romer (1999) , and Frankel and Rose (2000) ). In general, repercussions on third countries are frequently neglected.
These last remarks echo a recent complaint of Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) about the failure to pay adequate attention to the constraints on aggregate trade in estimating gravity equations for bilateral trade. In order to deal with the problem, they propose a nonlinear method of estimating these equations that incorporates "multilateral trade resistance," or a term expressing the tariff-equivalent of all of the barriers to trade (both domestic and foreign), viewed as a whole. I propose instead -if only as a start -to introduce separate variables to reflect possible substitution or scale effects of bilateral trade on trade with third countries and to see whether these variables emerge as significant and which sign they bear.
Of my relevant experiments, I will report only on those relating to distance and special political relationships.
As regards distance, my study uses relative distance to reflect possible substitution effects between different foreign countries, where relative distance refers to the absolute distance between a trading pair divided by their average distance to third countries (to be defined more precisely below). When relative distance enters in the tests side by side with average distance to all the rest, relative distance emerges as the larger and statistically more significant of the two. Thus, most of the impact of distance in the usual gravity equations of bilateral trade must be attributed to substitution effects between alternative trade partners.
This last result may help to understand some previous evidence. Even though transportation costs have fallen greatly over the last two centuries, applications of gravity equations to the second half of the nineteenth century (Flandreau (1995) ) and the interwar period (Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) ) show lower effects of distance on trade than more recent applications over the last thirty years. If the effects of distance on bilateral trade refer mostly to aggregate trade, there is a puzzle. In that case, distance should have declined in influence over the last couple of centuries. If, instead, the effects of distance refer mostly to substitution between alternative trade partners, there is no difficulty of interpretation. With the fall in transportation barriers over time, relative distances could simply count much more now in deciding how far goods will travel abroad than they did earlier (Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) say as much).
On the issue of the scale or substitution effects of political associations, the study considers all five political variables that Rose (2000) and Frankel and Rose (2000) introduce into gravity equations: namely, currency union, membership in a common country (as in the case of Greenland and Denmark or the Falklands and the UK), regional trade agreements, relations between former colony and colonizer, and relations between former colonies of the same colonizer. The results show that all five variables increase trade among the parties to the relationships. In addition, the first three relationships -all of them except those concerning former colonial relations -also breed trade with outsiders and therefore increase foreign trade in the aggregate. Similar tests by other researchers covering the same study period -1970 to 1995 -concur. Frankel experimented widely with the effect of free trade agreements on outsiders in studies with Stein and Wei (e.g., Wei (1995, 1998) , and ), and in his pooled results (Frankel (1997) ), reports the same promotion of trade with outsiders. In addition, Rose and Frankel-Rose find similar tradecreating effects for currency unions. I simply display the generality of the finding: all privileged political relationships except those associated with past colonialism promote foreign trade between the principals and the rest.
If this be puzzling, it is perhaps less so in regard to currency union than free trade agreement and political association. Consider free trade. Admittedly, a reduction in trade barriers between two countries without any similar lowering of barriers with the rest may be trade-diverting. Based on this logic, Frankel invokes special political hypotheses in order to explain his result that free trade agreements (FTAs) foster trade with outsiders. Drawing from the literature, he cites various possibilities: competitive liberalization; the possible build up of a political constituency in favor of liberalization through the revelation of exportcompetitiveness after countries enter into a FTA; and so forth (Frankel (1997) , ch. 10). But a currency union can be viewed with a different eye. If some countries form a currency union, there are fewer currencies and fewer units of account in the world, and therefore lower trade barriers for everyone. Hence, currency union may not represent a discriminatory reduction of trade barriers at all. For example, since the euro started circulating as a currency in 2002, and therefore bank drafts could be written conveniently in euros in commodity trade, British and Swedish households have been able to store euros instead of 12 monies in commodity trade with euro members. The households have also been able to benefit from fewer units of account in this trade. Thus, they can now reap many of the same advantages of lower transaction costs, greater ease of calculation, and greater transparency of prices that the members of the EMU get. Furthermore, in so far as EMU broadly interferes with political controls on capital movements and instructions to fund managers to hold home-currency assets, the arrangement promotes capital-market integration worldwide. In theory, as Rogoff (1996, 2000) demonstrate, this could mean more trade in goods in general.
As regards currency union, Rose has surprised everyone (including himself) with the size of the impact on trade that he found. He has also reported numerous tests of the robustness of his finding. The further experiments here concern the suspicion (occasionally voiced elsewhere) 1 that his sample of currency unions is biased, and the unions always occur 1 See the comment by Marco Pagano in the Economic Panel discussion of Rose's paper (Rose (2000) , p. 39), and Persson (200l) . between countries with unusually low trade barriers between one another. If that were so, the impact of currency union in Rose's tests might largely reflect other factors besides a common currency. In fact, Rose's data permits testing this hypothesis. My tests exploit the presence of other political variables in the analysis (whose coefficients are therefore not to be considered "nuisance parameters," in opposition to Rose's designation). Interestingly, the tests confirm the suspected bias, but the correction for it only moderates Rose's result without upsetting the outcome. More precisely, the correction cuts down the estimate of the impact of currency union on the log of trade by half. As a consequence, therefore, currency union, as such, doubles instead of roughly quadrupling trade. On this basis, I conclude that the tests essentially support Rose's stand.
In more recent work with van Wincoop, Rose offers a different ground for reducing his earlier estimate of the influence of currency union on trade (Rose and van Wincoop (2001) ), or at least does so in the case of currency unions between countries that already traded a lot with one another beforehand (including the EMU). The argument is that, in these cases, currency union would not reduce the price of home goods nearly as much in trade within the union as it does for the existing currency unions in his sample, since bilateral trade with the partners would already be much higher as a percentage of total foreign trade in the first place. A more recent paper still by Glick and Rose (2002) offers evidence supporting both my criticism of Rose's earlier work and my reduction in his estimate of the impact of currency union on trade. In this joint study, the authors employ an enlarged data set, which contains many more time series observations for individual trading pairs. As a result, they are able to obtain an estimate of the impact of currency union for individual trading pairs over time, or "within" as well as "between" estimates. Their "between" estimate of this impact is as high as Rose's earlier ones, while their "within" estimate drops to the lower level in my study. Glick and Rose pose their lower "within" estimate as the right one, without commenting on the reason for their higher "between" one. I shall argue that the gap between the two stems from the fact that the lower estimate properly concerns the impact of currency union as such, whereas the higher one, in line with Rose's earlier results, does not do so but regards the combined impact of currency union and other influences on trade. 2
The discussion will cover each of the tests in succession, and will end with a few brief general remarks.
II. The data and initial tests
All of the tests rest on the data in Frankel and Rose (2000) , which is available on Rose's web site. 3 My indebtedness to Rose for making his data public, and for including detailed instructions on how to use it, is enormous. I made two initial changes in the data set: one concerning distance, the other language. Whereas Rose locates countries at their geographical center (in conformity with the CIA), I place them wherever their most populous city stands (as found on the CD-rom encarta). Subsequently, the arc-geometry formula for great-circle distances serves me for calculating the bilateral distances between trading partners. This method produces identical results to those found in the atlases and related web sites. 4 In the case of language, I kept Rose's series but made a few obvious corrections (most of which he subsequently incorporated). The difference in our measures of great-circle distances could matter in studying parts of the world with complicated political geographies, including Western Europe and Southeast Asia. For example, Rose's measure places East Germany closer to the UK than West Germany and France still further from the UK than West Germany, whereas mine does the opposite (with London-Paris setting the UK-France distance and London-Frankfurt the UK-West Germany one). But those changes turn out to be trivial over the entire world sample of observations of bilateral trade. (The correlation between our two measures of distance in the world sample of over 40,000 observations is .987.) Similarly, my changes in denoting common languages between countries have no impact on the estimates (though this might alter if we examined language in detail). 5
The first two columns of table 1 
III. The forces of geography
The relevant gravity equation is known to be broadly consistent with the model of monopolistic competition in trade (subject to Anderson and van Wincoop's reservations). But recent research shows that it can also be obtained from models with homogenous goods.
Proceeding from homogeneous goods, Deardorff (1998) showed how to derive the equation from the factor proportions model. Proceeding similarly, Eaton and Kortum (1997) obtained the equation from random technological differences between countries. Nonetheless, efforts to introduce factor proportions directly into the equation have had little success thus far (see Frankel (1997) , p. 134), and though Eaton and Kortum did get good results with technological knowledge, they did so only with respect to manufacturing in 19 OECD countries.
Yet geography alone could carry information about comparative advantage, and therefore could carry information about both factor proportions (Deardorff) and international differences in production functions (Eaton and Kortum). As mentioned above, so far as the comparative advantage of different countries is related to differences in climate and seasons, differences in latitude North-South should capture the variable. Such differences, by themselves, though, would treat Argentina as distant from Greece, whereas the two countries are at comparable latitudes in the two hemispheres and have similar climates. As a result, I experimented with differences in absolute latitudes, as well as differences North-South. 6 The differences in absolute latitudes would then relate specifically to climate, whereas the differences North-South would also pertain to the opposition of the seasons in the two hemispheres, and any factors of environment that are associated with the separate features of the Northern and Southern hemispheres (as, for example, the higher ratio of land to water in the North).
As shown in columns (3), (4), and (5) of the table, if used alone, either one of these two measures of latitudinal distance (respectively labeled North-South Difference and Difference in Absolute Latitudes) emerges as highly significant and with the expected positive sign. But when joined together, the North-South variable is dominant. 7 Indeed, the Difference in Absolute Latitudes becomes insignificant. For this reason, I will keep strictly the North-6 If we let lat1 and lat2 stand for the respective latitudes of country 1 and country 2 in a trading pair (with Northern latitudes positive and Southern ones negative), then the North-South Difference is lat1 − lat2 and the Difference in Latitudes is lat1 − lat2.
7 Another geographical variable that has frequently appeared in the discussion is distance from the Tropics. See, for example, Sachs and Warner (1997) and Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) . This next variable is supposed to reflect the low trade of countries near the Equator resulting from a poverty of endowment. (For a radically different interpretation of this variable, though, see Hall and Jones (1999) .) Based on the same notation as in the preceding note, the distance from the Tropics is lat1 + lat2. The variable is always insignificant in my tests.
South Difference in the subsequent discussion. However, the correlation between the two measures of latitudinal distance (in logs) is high: 0.73. Therefore, the North-South Difference should perhaps be viewed as largely standing for both.
IV. The effects of distance
Does the impact of distance on bilateral trade reflect switching between closer and more distant partners, or does distance affect aggregate foreign trade, or both? One simple way to get at this question is to introduce some measure of relative distance between countries, or to consider the distance between countries relative to the average distance between country pairs and all of the other countries in the world. To be specific, let the straight-line average of the (great-circle) distances of a country from all the other 185 in the sample be termed remoteness. 8 If we use d ij to refer to the distance between countries i and j, and R i and R j to refer to their respective remoteness, the relative distance between countries i and j can be defined as d ij 2 /R i R j . This relative distance variable is clearly intimately related to the concept by the same name that Deardorff (1998) introduced into the gravity model (compare Bergstrand (1998) ). The variable is also entirely in the spirit of Anderson and van
Wincoop's measure of "multilateral trade resistance" (except that their term combines all of the barriers to trade in the gravity equation in a single term: political borders, differences in language, differences in currency -everything).
There is a relative distance for each observation in the database. If we take the average of these relative distances, the value cannot be far from 1 (it is actually 1.03). Therefore, if expressed in logs, the variable will be centered on zero, and will show negative values for relative distances below the mean, and positive values for relative distances above the mean.
But the log of the product of remoteness R i R j will always be positive. Suppose then that we run a regression that includes both relative distance and the product of remoteness in logs.
(Evidently, this is equivalent to including distance since log (d ij 2 /R i R j ) plus log R i R j equals log d ij 2 .) If the bilateral distances d ij induce no substitution effects at all in trades with alternative country pairs but always damage aggregate foreign trade, the coefficient of relative distance should be insignificant and close to zero while that of remoteness should be significantly negative. Suppose instead that trading distances below the mean really raise trade at the expense of trading distances above the mean while they do not affect aggregate foreign trade.
Then the relative distance variable should be significantly negative while the impact of remoteness should be close to nil. Of course, even in this last instance, we would hesitate to conclude that distance does not affect aggregate trade, since if that were the case, then when entered alone, absolute distance d ij would be insignificant, which we know to be false.
However, distance could bear both a substitution and a scale effect on foreign trade.
Therefore, relative distance and remoteness could both enter simultaneously with significant negative signs.
The first column in table 2 repeats the earlier estimate in table 1 with the Difference North-South but without the Difference in Absolute Latitudes. The second column in table 2 next substitutes remoteness (R i R j ) for absolute distance, and the third column includes both relative distance and remoteness together. The exact correlation between relative distance and remoteness in logs is low, only 0.23. From the second column, we see that if remoteness simply replaces bilateral distance (d ij ) as the measure of distance, both the coefficient and the significance of distance fall, but both remain very high. (Note that the elasticity of the influence of distance is still on the same order as in the usual estimates in this case.) In addition, the coefficients and Student ts of border and language (especially border) notably rise, and the coefficient of North-South Difference turns negative. This is not surprising, since these last three variables now largely reflect geographical proximity between trading pairs.
But the third column is the fundamental one. When relative distance and remoteness are both present together, relative distance completely dominates remoteness, with a Student t about 15 times higher. Moreover, relative distance retains a coefficient of around one-half the size of d ij 's, whereas the coefficient of remoteness, though still significant, becomes a fraction of d ij 's. In addition, the impact of North-South Difference returns to a positive value, and this positive value is the same as before in column 1. To all evidence, therefore, distance exerts mostly a substitution effect rather than a scale effect on foreign trade.
As mentioned before, this last result helps to interpret some earlier evidence. Previous authors have commented on the improbably high magnitudes of the effects of distance on aggregate trade in gravity equations (e.g., Grossman (1998) 
V. The effects of political associations
The next series of tests concern the five political variables in Rose and Frankel's tests:
Currency Union, Political Union, Free Trade Area (FTA), Ex-Colonial Relationship, and Ex-Common Colonizer. According to Rose's series, some countries (territories or departments in certain cases) in a political union also belong to a "free trade area" (to use Rose's term (2000)) whereas others do not, depending on whether or not there exists a separate free trade agreement between them. Instead, I adopt the principle that a political union always implies a free trade area, and therefore score country pairs as belonging to a Free Trade Area only if they are not part of a Political Union. This will clarify the subsequent interpretation of the results, as we will see. Following this further change in the data (in addition to the earlier ones in the preceding section), the estimate of the basic gravity equation is the one in the first column of table 3. As we know already from Frankel and Rose (2000) , all five political 9 Boisso and Ferrantino (1997) notably show that exports travel longer distances since 1960.
10 Of course, if transportation costs should ever become tiny, further reductions in these costs would not continue to raise the influence of relative distance on bilateral trade. Currency Union/Outsider in such tests for currency unions. Furthermore, these earlier studies report the same results for the relevant dummies: that is, both FTAs and currency unions increase trade with outsiders. As indicated before, I largely exhibit the generality of the finding. Instead of merely testing for third-country effects of different political variables one at a time, I test for all of them together, and show that monetary union, Political Union, and free trade agreements all promote trade with outsiders. Furthermore, in all three cases, the trade creation among the members of the political associations themselves is much higher than 11 Any effort to introduce separate dummies for the impact of Ex-Colonial Relationship and Ex-Common-Colonizer on outsiders would only lead to confusion. Both dummies would comprise cases of trade between an ex-colonized and an outsider, and the main differences between the two would concern instances of an Ex-Colonial Relationship or an Ex-Common Colonizer, and therefore would be reflected in these other two variables.
12 Though he refers instead to a variable that he terms "openness," which combines FTA and FTA/Outsider (but when used together with FTA, essentially denotes FTA/Outsider).
that with outsiders, but both effects are well marked. It may be noted as well that in the tests concerning influences on third parties, the number of observations relating to third-party effects is a multiple of the one relating to the associated effects on the principals themselves (by an order of four). Also, the new dummy variables do not detract from anything in the rest of the equation.
VI. Currency union
The final part of the discussion focuses on the hottest topic in connection with the political variables: the impact of Currency Union. This last political variable has a coefficient of around 1.5 with a Student t of 8 in columns 1 and 2. Taken at face value, the coefficient would say that entering into a currency union increases trade between the members by a factor of 3.5 (exp(1.5) ≈ 4.5). But there is good reason to think that countries will only form a currency union if they already enjoy particularly close economic or political ties with one another. If so, much of the 1.5 coefficient of currency union may be attributable to features of the relationship having nothing to do with a common currency. The first two columns of It so happens that the 284 usable observations of bilateral trade between members of a currency union (because of no missing complementary data) divide into 108 cases of country pairs that are also members of a political union or a FTA and 176 country pairs that are not.
Of the 176 observations of pairs in a currency union belonging to neither a political union nor a FTA, most concern Africans with a shared colonial past. The estimates in columns 3 and 4 confirm the hypothesis that currency unions imply exceptionally close trade ties, whether or not the countries in the relationship belong to a common country or have signed a free trade covenant. If Rose's interpretation of the coefficient of Currency Union is correct, the coefficient of Combined Currency Union in column 3 should be much higher than that of Strict Currency Union, since this coefficient should reflect the combined influence of currency union and either Political Union or FTA (a combined influence that is not reflected elsewhere in the equation). But this is not the case.
The difference between the two coefficients is only about 0.3. Instead, it would need to be 13 The reason for avoiding the fabrication of two such dummies is similar to the one for failing to provide separate dummies for the impact of colonized/colonizer and common colonizer on outsiders (footnote 11): any such attempt would simply raise problems of interpretation. However, the estimates in columns 3 and 4 are also impossible to reconcile with the view that currency union does not raise trade at all. To see this, consider the coefficient 2.18
of Combined Currency Union in column 3. According to the rest of this column, the part of this coefficient reflecting nationhood or FTA should be around 1.2. Another 0.25 may be added to reflect the fact that nearly one-half of the observations of Combined Currency Union relate to country pairs that not only belong to the same nation or a FTA, but also share a common earlier colonizer (0.5 applied to one half of the observations yields 0.25). This gives a total of 1.45. Therefore, currency union must account for the difference of 0.73, or 2.18 minus 1.45, and this difference is statistically significant. 16 The 0.73 estimate is also coherent.
It would mean that of the 1.87 coefficient of Strict Currency Union, 1.14 of it − a reasonable amount in light of the rest of the estimate − should be attributed to combined effects of lower trade barriers and past colonial relations rather than a common currency, as such.
In the case of column 4, similar reasoning requires a higher estimate than 0.73 for the impact of a common currency, as such, since the previous attribution of 1.45 to other factors applies only to about two-thirds of the observations of Combined Currency Union, and as regards the remaining third (relating strictly to country pairs with a shared colonial past), the right attribution is 0.5. This yields a weighted-average attribution to other factors of around Glick and Rose's "within" estimate is 0.74 and their "between" estimate 1.57.
Effectively, therefore, their "within" estimate matches exactly mine for the impact of a common currency on bilateral trade after the corrections, while their "between" one basically repeats Rose's own earlier estimates for the impact of currency union, alone or with Frankel, and my uncorrected estimates in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 . There could hardly be closer correspondence. Admittedly, Glick and Rose's "within" estimate is statistically superior to mine as regards the impact of currency union as such. But my effort clarifies the gap between their "within" and "between" estimates, which they leave unexplained. Number of observations = 31010 Number of clusters = 7963 As can be seen, the results are highly confirmatory. The only doubts of any note that arise concern the positive third-country effects of Currency Union and Political Union. Compare the discussion of Pakko and Wall (2001) in note 2. any putative future attempts to treat currency union the same way, go contrary to the facts.
The gravity model thus may need to be specified in a way that allows for complementary effects on bilateral trade with third countries. There is no problem in theory. But in practical application, such specification will complicate the programming of the constraints on total trade in bilateral trade relations, or the construction of "multilateral trade resistance." For example, Rose and van Wincoop (2001) have simply excluded all complementary effects on third countries. Regressand is log of bilateral trade in real American dollars. Number of Observations is 31,101 for the first column, 31,010 for the rest.
Year-specific fixed effects are not reported. Robust standard errors recorded in parentheses. 
